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ABSTRACT
The expansion of Islamic State control in Iraq led to massive internal displacement. Iraq now
has one of the largest internally displaced populations in the world. Many families found rela-
tive safety in government-controlled towns throughout the country; a large proportion sought
refuge in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), having ﬂed from its northern territories where
Arabs, Kurds, Yezidis, Assyrians and Turkmen each claimed demographic dominance. Conse-
quently, the KRI has become a sanctuary to almost a million Iraqi IDPs of varying ethnic
backgrounds and cultures. This article draws on extensive regional ﬁeldwork to explore the
relationship between education provision for displaced populations and broader ethno-sectarian
and socio-political inﬂuences. The article will unpack the research question: “In what ways
does education for IDPs in KRI exacerbate or mitigate conﬂict?” and will highlight key areas
in which misunderstanding of identity politics has resulted in reduced quality education for
displaced populations.
INTRODUCTION
Iraq is currently facing one of the most volatile and complex humanitarian crises in the world. The
territorial conﬂict with the Islamic State (IS) forced over 3 million people to ﬂee their homes in
large waves of displacement. Many families found relative safety in government-controlled towns
and cities throughout the country, with a large proportion of the internally displaced persons (IDPs)
seeking refuge in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I). This inﬂux of IDPs added to the exist-
ing 245,000 displaced Syrian refugees currently registered in the region (UNHCR, 2015). The so-
called “mega-crisis” caused the KR-I’s population to increase by 28 per cent in a matter of months,
with the total number of refugees and IDP’s now amounting to roughly 1.4 million, while the
Kurdish population stands at only 5-million (World Bank, 2015).
The devastating human cost of the conﬂict continues to be felt across the region, and the needs
of the affected populations have reached an unprecedented scale. The impact on children and youth
has been particularly overwhelming, with interrupted education, exposure to severe harm and abuse
and a lack of opportunities for the future. Such violence has left many IDP children in danger of
becoming increasingly marginalized as the conﬂict continues. The international community has rec-
ognized the danger of a “lost generation” in Iraq and Syria, and global emphasis has been placed
on the need to improve services to children affected by the regional crisis (UNICEF, 2014).
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Finding sustainable ways to help re-empower children and youth is crucial to the future of Iraq.
As such, ensuring access to quality education for displaced children will form the cornerstone for
long-term stabilization efforts. Access to education during emergencies is not only considered a
human right but can also serve humanitarian aims. During times of crisis, schools can provide the
stability, structure and routine that children need to cope with conﬂict-induced loss and fear. Fur-
thermore, attending school can help protect children from risks, including gender-based violence,
recruitment into armed groups, child labour and early marriage.
Yet the delivery of emergency education has a two-way interaction with the promotion of stabil-
ity and conﬂict. Education provision can interact with debates over return, identity and equality,
each of which requires careful negotiation in the Iraqi context. If education interventions are not
sensitive to the conﬂict, the provision of schooling for displaced populations can become politicized
or feed into conﬂict narratives by creating resentment and division. It is, therefore, necessary to
understand the relationship between the crisis context and education delivery to ensure that educa-
tion minimizes negative impacts for displaced children in the KR-I. Unfortunately, while academic
recognition has been given to the political and sectarian dimensions of the Iraq crisis, the relation-
ship between these issues and emergency education provision has lacked rigorous analysis.
In this respect the article will explore the nexus between IDP education provision in the KR-I
and broader ethno-sectarian inﬂuences. It will demonstrate that the socio-political environment in
the north of Iraq necessitates concerted attention when providing education for IDPs in the KR-I.
By unpacking the central research question of: ‘In what ways does education for IDPs in KRI exac-
erbate or mitigate conﬂict?’ the article will highlight key areas in which identity and politics have
hampered or constrained access to quality education for displaced populations.
The ﬁndings will be organized and presented in three central sections. Firstly, the article will
locate the research within the wider academic literature on education in conﬂict and emergencies. It
will then move on to provide the necessary contextual background to the current crisis and the pre-
existing issues of territorial dispute and ethnopolitics. The third section will present the ﬁndings on
the current state of emergency education provision in the KRI and the factors that require negotia-
tion to enable equitable access for all IDP communities.
EDUCATION IN EMERGENCIES
During displacement, educational opportunities are frequently one of the highest requested services
for communities. Dryden-Peterson (2011) notes that three central rationales underpin the provision
of education in emergencies. Firstly, education can form a component of the immediate response to
displacement, providing children with protection and serving as an entry point for psychosocial
support and referral mechanisms to highlight children at risk. The second rationale falls within a
human rights approach. Access to education is a fundamental human right recognized by the 1948,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; with subsequent treaties reafﬁrming the rights for
speciﬁc groups, such as girls, persons with disabilities, migrants, refugees and indigenous people;
as well as in speciﬁc contexts, such as during armed conﬂicts or after natural disasters. The impor-
tance of education is also articulated as an “enabling right,” a right through which other rights are
realized (UNHCR, 2011: 18); as such, education is framed as providing “skills that people need to
reach their full potential and to exercise their other rights, such as the right to life and health”
(INEE, 2010: 7).
The third rationale highlights education’s developmental focus. It acknowledges education as a
long-term investment for society. Education’s intersections with societies’ social, economic, politi-
cal and security sectors leave it well placed to have far-reaching impacts across a range of conﬂict
stabilization and developmental objectives. Politically, educational governance provides the
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opportunity to reinforce the legitimacy of government actors (Thyne, 2006; Østby et al., 2009)
within the security agenda schools can provide safe spaces, teach non-violent conﬂict resolution,
ﬁght radicalization and aid reintegration of young combatants into the community to de-escalate
ﬁghting (Sinclair, 2001; Burde et al., 2017) and economically, education can build the skills for the
development of livelihoods (Dryden-Peterson, 2011). Neglecting these aims during displacement
can, therefore, have further long-term impacts on a society’s reconstruction.
These rationales reﬂect education’s important role within society; yet it is no longer considered a
neutral technical pursuit, especially in fragile contexts. Over the past decade the international edu-
cation agenda has shifted to recognize education’s potentially harmful inﬂuence over social dynam-
ics and the spheres of security, governance and economics. The theoretical relationship between
education and conﬂict has now been well documented. The seminal report by Bush and Saltarelli
(2000) that described education as having “two faces,” one that can exacerbate conﬂict and one that
lessens those risks to build peace has given rise to a subﬁeld of education research in this topic. It
is now widely acknowledged that education structure, content and management can serve to inﬂu-
ence conﬂict (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000; Gaigals and Leonhardt, 2001; Davies, 2004; Smith, 2010;
Mundy and Dryden-Peterson, 2011; Østby and Urdal, 2011; Conﬂict Sensitivity Consortium,
2012).
There are many entry points from which education can exercise inﬂuence over conﬂict drivers.
Education provides the knowledge and skills necessary for economic development and societal
mobility. Therefore, equity between groups is essential to avoid grievances generated by “horizontal
inequalities” (Stewart, 2011). Unequal access to education can result in disparities between commu-
nities creating conﬂict, reinforcing political dominance or marginalising certain societal groups
(Sommers, 2004). Furthermore, education content holds signiﬁcant inﬂuence over the transmission
of values, with every area of the curriculum carrying the potential to communicate implicit and
explicit political messages (Gallagher, 2004; Kirk and Winthrop, 2007; King, 2011) as such educa-
tion holds the potential to further ensconce inequity, divisions, discrimination and structural vio-
lence along religious, cultural, ethnic or linguistic lines (INEE, 2017).
It is crucial, therefore, to pay attention to the overlapping interactions between education policy,
planning and implementation and the dynamics of a conﬂict. Merely ensuring that children and
youth are provided with basic education services during displacement does not automatically trans-
late into positive societal outcomes. The provision of education for IDPs and refugees during times
of conﬂict is a fundamentally political process. The delivery and content of education for those
who are displaced hold the potential to exacerbate conﬂict and alienate children along ethnic or
geographical lines. However, unfortunately, as Dryden-Peterson (2011, 62) notes “deeply-rooted
assumptions that children transcend geopolitical differences have shaped the ways in which refugee
education is conceived”. To counter this, emergency education planning requires concerted efforts
to recognize that education does not exist in isolation from the broader social, political and eco-
nomic inﬂuences that may have created displacement.
Educational policy and practice are overwhelmingly impacted by the interests and political priori-
ties of a disparate range of stakeholders. In order to examine the power structures that drive or inhi-
bit education delivery for IDP populations in Iraq, we require a theoretical framing that is
particularly sensitive to these dynamics. The article, therefore, proposes drawing on a political
economy framework in this respect. Political economy analysis offers a useful theoretical tool for
educationalists and has been noted for its utility in relation to the exploration of the social, political
and economic inﬂuences on education (Kingdon et al., 2014; Novelli et al., 2015). Political econ-
omy can be deﬁned as ‘the interaction of political and economic processes in a society: the distri-
bution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create,
sustain and transform these relationships over time’ (Collinson, 2011;: 3). Therefore, applying such
a framework champions the examination of “relationships between individuals and society”
(Novelli et al., 2015: 10) and encourages the exploration of causes and consequences of unequal
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and asymmetric power relations between social groups (Dasgupta, 1985; Caporaso and Levine,
1992). This framing is deemed particularly relevant to our investigation due to the ethno-political
competition over power, territory and resources that is driving displacement in Iraq.
When applied to education, political economy analysis highlights the use of policies and prac-
tices that “are concerned with access to education, quality of learning and teaching, the language of
instruction, curriculum, teacher recruitment and resource allocation across ethnically and geographi-
cally diverse regions” (Pherali and Sahar, 2018:243). The UNICEF Peacebuilding Education
Research Consortium has developed an education-focused framework that builds on political econ-
omy to explore education delivery from the perspective of what it terms “the 4Rs”; Representation,
Recognition, Reconciliation and Redistribution (Novelli et al., 2015). This investigation will draw
on this understanding to explore the extent to which education provision for IDPs can be seen to
be creating conﬂict in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
BACKGROUND
Identity is central to the conﬂict in Iraq; many commentators agree that the roots of the current
crisis can be found in the sectarian political system perpetuated by former Prime Minister Nouri al-
Maliki (Laub and Masters, 2014; Gulmohamad, 2014; Hagan et al., 2015; Stansﬁeld, 2014). Mali-
ki’s political marginalization of Sunni leaders and sectarian command of the Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF) led to anti-government protest movements in Sunni areas such as Anbar and Salah ad-Din in
2013 (Adnan, 2014; Katzman, 2014). The increasing Shia representation in the ISF alienated Sun-
nis, who reported abductions, deliberate killings and unlawful arrest. Consequently, the Sunni com-
munity increasingly turned to ethnically and religiously afﬁliated militias for protection, such as
neighbourhood watches and tribal insurgent groups (Krieg, 2014). Groups representing a variety of
positions, from Salaﬁst-jihadists to Sunni nationalists, mobilized against Baghdad after 2013, shar-
ing a common platform of grievance, accusing the government of failing to represent the interests
of Iraq’s Sunni community (Adnan, 2014). This growing divide was used to the advantage of the
group known locally as Da’esh, who channelled Sunni discontent towards their own aims, taking
control of territory throughout the country.
The takeover of territory by Da’esh (or the Islamic State as they became known internationally)
and the counter-insurgency operation launched by the government, have led to Iraq now contending
with massive internal displacement (IOM, 2017). The retake of territory has seen population move-
ments come in waves, with families ﬂeeing both Da’esh control and the subsequent government
response. Place of settlement was primarily affected by travel restrictions imposed throughout Iraq,
preventing easy access into safe areas controlled both by the Government of Iraq in Baghdad, and
the Kurdish Regional Government in Erbil. Population movements were often controlled by check-
points enforcing a system of entry requirements (World Report Human Rights Watch, 2016). These
policies were noted to be inconsistent between locations and changed periodically without notice.
Disturbingly, reports demonstrated that freedom of movement was often linked to ethnic identity
or place of origin, disproportionately affecting Sunni Arab civilians World Report Human Rights
Watch, 2016. Human rights groups have suggested that in the south, this limited the movement of
Sunni IDPs into mostly Shia provinces – such as families from Anbar trying to access places like
Baghdad, Karbala and Basra. While in the north the Kurdish authorities were more stringent with
Arab IDPs than they were with Yezidis, Christians and those with a perceived Kurdish ethnicity,
resulting in Sunni and Shia Arabs and Turkmen being stopped at the border (see Human Rights
Watch, Amnesty International, Minority Rights Group). Such identity driven policies were high-
lighted when IS seized control of large swathes of land across what is known as the disputed terri-
tories or disputed internal boundaries (DIBs); districts bordering the KRI that are disputed between
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the central Baghdad government and the Kurdistan region’s seat of power, Erbil. The region has
been deﬁned by ethnically distinct contests over historical homelands and competing strategic inter-
ests for decades (Anderson and Stansﬁeld, 2011). The religiously deﬁned and sectarian agenda of
IS therefore played out against an already fragile backdrop of ethnically deﬁned tensions (Shanks,
2016). The multi-ethnic make-up of the region saw the ﬁrst large-scale inﬂux of IDPs towards the
KR-I being made up of families from varied ethnic backgrounds.
Christians and minorities with perceived Kurdish ethnic markers were able to enter the KR-I
more freely due to procedures that prioritized residency for those with sponsors in the region. Con-
sequently, during the initial outbreak of the conﬂict, interviewees and focus groups participants
reported that many without local connections, such as Shabak, Shia Turkmen and Sunni Arabs,
were denied entry. Numerous Turkmen and Shabak from Tel Afar and other regions subsequently
ﬂed to Baghdad, Najaf and Karbala for resettlement in Shia areas, while, countless Sunni Arabs
from Mosul – who feared both IS rule and the subsequent aerial bombardment by the Iraqi air
force – failed to meet the sponsorship requirements and ultimately returned to their homes. How-
ever, subsequent military movements in Anbar, Salah al-Din and Diyala changed this dynamic as
the region opened its doors to many more desperate families ﬂeeing violence in Sunni Arab
dominated areas.
The inﬂux of IDPs into the KR-I varies from the rest of the country in terms of its diverse ethnic
makeup. IDPs represent a number of community groups, each with their own opposing cultural
environments and political perspectives. Both the geographical proximity to the demographically
varied Ninewa, and the KRG entry restrictions, have resulted in the IDP population being com-
posed of a number of distinct minority identity groups with complex inter-communal dynamics.
The pre-existing territorial dispute in the region also serves to shape the relationship between the
host government and the arriving IDPS. Despite their welcome into the region on the grounds of a
shared “Kurdish” identity, some elements within both the Christian and Yezidi IDP populations
have suggested this to be an imposed identity due to territorial claims on their homelands by Kur-
dish political authorities. One interlocutor commented, “they call us Kurds because they see our
land as theirs. However, this does not make us Kurdish”.
Regardless of the territory being reclaimed from IS, IDPs return to their place of origin continues
to be restricted, as liberation is seen as an opportunity for actors to assert power over contested
towns and villages. In the disputed territories that border the KRI, the battle with IS has been a pre-
lude to a multitude of localised conﬂicts between actors scrambling for administrative control. Sub-
sequently, across the DIBs and within the IDP population, minority groups have been pulled into a
clash over demographic composition as each disputed district faces ethnically or politically deﬁned
claims. Such broader political and security driven agendas have ramiﬁcations for those communities
displaced from their homes, and require scrutiny when delivering humanitarian aid, in particular,
emergency education, to ensure no harm is done.
Methodology
In order to address the central research question: “In what ways does education for IDPs in
KRI exacerbate or mitigate conﬂict?”, the researcher employed a purposive sampling method
involving qualitative data collection tools. Focus group discussions and semi-structured inter-
views formed the key modality of primary data collection, with consultations conducted in
Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Duhok and Kirkuk. This was further supported by secondary document
analysis; local and international media, social media, NGO ﬁeld reports and cluster meeting
minutes, and various ethnically afﬁliated human rights agency reports were examined to triangu-
late ﬁeld ﬁndings.
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Participants were selected through existing local networks, consultation with staff within the
camps and community leaders. The criteria for participant selection centred around two focal
points. The ﬁrst was the general rule of achieving a purposive sample which was representative of
the IDP communities. In this respect, it was necessary to achieve equal representation of interlocu-
tors from the different ethnically and linguistically deﬁned groups in each location. Secondly, the
participant needed to be knowledgeable about the research questions on education. Therefore, semi-
structured interviews were conducted in each governorate with over 20 education providers, practi-
tioners and those with a stake in education provision, and IDPs and refugees between the ages of
16–21 were invited to take part in focus group discussions. Twelve focus groups involving a total
of 119 young people aged between 16–21 were conducted. Of the focus group participants, 55 per
cent were female, and 45 per cent were male. Focus groups included youth and community repre-
sentatives from the host communities, Karakoash, Mosul, Salah al-Din and Shingal. Ethical consid-
erations with regard to conducting FGDs with youth were reﬂected upon carefully.1
The political realities of the situation impacted on the data collection and consultation pro-
cess. The environment of insecurity led to a degree of distrust and a number of steps were taken to
overcome this obstacle to data collection. Firstly, where the use of a translator was necessary care
was taken to ensure that he or she came from within the community being interviewed. In addition,
focus groups were closed spaces for participants only; when camp management requested admis-
sion, diplomatic measures were taken to ensure separate space was created to speak with them.
Finally, it became apparent that note-taking made some participants uncomfortable. In these cases,
interview notes were written up directly after interviews but without direct quotes, for fear of
misquoting participants.
KRI IDP EDUCATION PROVISION
Tomasevski (2001) notes that in order for education to be effective it must be of high quality, pro-
viding available, accessible, acceptable and adaptable provision. The provision of emergency edu-
cation for internally displaced children is often understood to be more straightforward than that of
refugees who have crossed borders into neighbouring countries. An assumed shared linguistic and
cultural heritage negates debates over curriculum choice and language of instruction; and shared
national education structures simplify issues regarding certiﬁcation. However, Iraq’s history of com-
plex ethno-politics has resulted in communities divided by strong linguistic and cultural identity
markers. Consequently, the IDPs arriving in the KR-I represent a variety of linguistic, cultural and
religious groups. In addition, the country has two seats of governance, the Kurdish regional govern-
ment in Erbil (KRG) and the Central government of Iraq in Baghdad, each with its own jurisdic-
tions and Ministries of Education.
The two Iraqi education systems differ in terms of delivery and structure. The KRG regional edu-
cation system has moved away from the central system, with a different updated curriculum that
reﬂects the place of the Kurds in Iraqi history (Shanks, 2015). Furthermore, they have restructured
the Kurdish school year, which has been divided into two semesters, each ending in ﬁnal exams.
By contrast, the Ministry of Education Baghdad continues with the old system, which facilitates
examinations at the end of the year and runs on a separate curriculum and timetable. Interviewees
reported that responsibility for the provision of education for IDPs is therefore ofﬁcially dependent
upon the IDPs’ place of origin. IDPs from al-Anbar, Diyala and Salah al-Din previously all fell
under the remit of the Central government’s Ministry of Education in Baghdad, and therefore con-
tinue to do so while displaced.
However, consultation revealed that IDPs who arrived in the ﬁrst wave of displacement ﬂeeing
IS movements in the north of Iraq have a more complicated allocation of responsibility. The
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districts from which they ﬂed in the Ninewa governorate have been highly contested between
Baghdad and Erbil since 2003. Thus, prior to IS takeover, the administration of these districts,
known as the Disputed Internal Boundaries, was mixed between the two regional powers, with an
often-overlapping system of service delivery based on language and identity (Shanks, 2015). Subse-
quently, education in the region was managed through a complicated mix of both the KRG and
Ministry of Education, Baghdad involvement. In short, the area had both KRG curriculum Kurdish
schools and central curriculum Arabic schools due to an unofﬁcial system of Kurdish patronage.
Despite it being outside their ofﬁcial remit, since 2003 the KRG took responsibility for all the eth-
nically homogenous Kurdish language schools and provided Kurdish instruction to many Kurdish
speaking Christian, Assyrian and Yezidi villages outside of their ofﬁcial jurisdiction.
Consequently, regardless of the central Ministry of Education’s ofﬁcial obligation towards all
IDP education, the KRG ministry has continued to take responsibility for the provision of education
to all those who choose to continue to learn in Kurdish while displaced, while the central ministry
took responsibility for Arabic provision for IDPs. To address the burgeoning needs of linguistically
appropriate education for Arabic IDPs, the Regional Directorate of Education from Ninewa was
relocated to Erbil and representatives from the central Baghdad ministry opened ofﬁces in the KR-I
to facilitate and oversee Arabic IDP education. The central Government of Iraq continued to pay
the salaries of civil servants who ﬂed their homes due to the conﬂict and displaced teachers were
therefore reallocated to IDP schools throughout the KRG. The MoE Erbil allowed enrolment of dis-
placed Kurdish speaking children into KRG schools and selected KRG schools were asked to
accommodate Arabic “shifts”. In addition, Ministry of education ofﬁcials noted that the MoE Bagh-
dad purchased buildings and UNICEF provided prefabs for the establishment of Arabic language
schools. Within the camps, tented and prefab schools were provided, for both languages, with the
assistance of international actors like UNICEF and UNESCO.
However, interview and focus group data supported Education Cluster reports stating that all IDP
schools are overstretched, operating in double and triple shifts, to meet demand. A lack of qualiﬁed
teachers undermines the quality of education provided, and funding remains low across the educa-
tion spectrum. UN and NGO reports note that enrolment in education has only been possible for a
small proportion of IDP children, with availability of school places and family-driven economic
responsibility listed as reasons for preventing attendance by interviewees and focus group partici-
pants. Lack of textbook availability in Arabic, due to large-scale destruction of books in IS-held
areas, further restricts the availability of schooling in Arabic. Education delivery faces multiple
restrictions due to the emergency context and the weak status of education infrastructure even prior
to the crisis. Moreover, in addition to these obstacles, education delivery for IDPs in the KRI face
a number of nuanced contextual challenges that can be seen to arise out of the wider conﬂict fragi-
lity and ethno-political environment. In order to present these challenges, the article will categorise
them into issues of 1) Access and learning environment 2) School management and teacher
recruitment and 3) Content and learning.
Access and learning environment
The INEE foundational standards for education provision in emergencies states that all children
should be provided with access to education and that learning environments need to be secure and
safe and promote the protection and psychological well-being of learners and teachers alike (INEE,
2010). In some circumstances, however, the realization of these aims was hampered in the KRI
education response due to a lack of understanding of the political and social context and its impact
on children’s experience of schooling.
During the initial emergency response phase in 2014, little consideration was given to the impli-
cations of integrating children from different ethnic and linguistic backgrounds within schools.
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Education programming concentrated on providing school access without consideration of the
effects of shared space on learning environments. Therefore, the researcher discovered that in some
IDP camps, children from different communities, with different conﬂict experiences, were brought
together in classrooms. While the provision of joint education services for different communities
can potentially promote social integration, this outcome is dependent on understanding existing
inter-communal relations and education content providing strong peace education elements to pro-
mote cohesion where necessary. The recognition of cultural diversity and acknowledgement of
difference is a key component of a conﬂict sensitive education system. Through the representation
of linguistic, religious and cultural variety, an education system can serve to build mutual respect
and tolerance (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000; Smith, 2010; Novelli et al., 2015). Yet, if these issues are
neglected, denied or addressed in a negative manner, integrated education can feed into conﬂicts.
In the KRI, IDP schools have limited capacity to deliver peace education. The two Iraqi curriculums
differ in the degree to which they represent Iraq’s minority identity groups, although both fail to ade-
quately represent the multicultural diversity of Iraq (Shanks, 2016). Moreover, the overstretched and
time-limited nature of IDP and refugee education provision in Iraq means that there is little room for
subjects that may address such issues. Furthermore, teachers are mostly from within the displaced
community and have their own conﬂict trauma to contend with, limiting their ability to serve as peace
negotiators. Focus groups frequently referenced the high levels of trauma in camps and the lack of
professional health services. Lastly, education personal in Iraq lacked the speciﬁc tools to deliver
peace education even before the crisis (Shanks, 2016). Therefore, IDP emergency schools were ill
equipped to manage the integration of children from different communities.
However, although not widespread, the research found that integration was attempted during the
emergency response phase in the KRI. Unfortunately, these attempts failed to consider not only the
limited capacity for such an undertaking, but also the contextual challenges of such a venture. One
striking example was presented in Arbat IDP camp located 20km southeast of the city of Sulaimani.
This camp, formally a closed refugee camp, became home to a mixed demographic of Arab, Yezidi
and Shebak IDPs in 2014. The Yezidi and Shebak IDPs came from the Ninewa governorate in the
aftermath of the fall of Mosul, while Arab residents of the camp were principally Sunni Muslims and
came from two separate places of origin: those from the Nineveh region, who arrived at the camp with
Yezidi and Shebak IDPs in August 2014 and those from the Salah ad-Din region who began arriving
in November 2014 after being displaced when Iraqi forces retook ISIS-held territory.
Education actors opened a school in a converted warehouse in Arbat IDP Camp and despite ini-
tial high enrolment from all communities, interviews with community leaders and focus groups
with youth both noted that Yezidi and Shabak student enrolment dropped drastically within the ﬁrst
school term. The most commonly cited explanation during consultations with community leaders
was that pupils experienced ethno-religious discrimination within the school environment. Commu-
nity leaders claimed that Yezidi and Shebak children were subjected to verbal abuse, mostly based
on their religious faith, by Arab students. With closer examination and understanding of the wider
conﬂict, such a negative dynamic might have been predicted. The camp demographics do
not reﬂect the ethno-religious population distributions found in the places of origin of the camp
residents and each community has a distinctly different conﬂict experience.
The residents from Salah ad-Din, who made up the majority Arab community in the camp, had
no previous residential exposure to Yezidi or Shebak communities. Negative stereotyping of
minorities is prevalent in Iraq, but more so in areas without mixed populations. Furthermore, the
Salah ad-Din residents had lived under IS occupation, only ﬂeeing during the government retalia-
tion. This in no way assumes that the Arab IDP community supported IS; many Sunni Arabs were
unable to ﬂee while IS had control of their districts. However, it can be suggested that many
minority IDPs would assume that some Sunni Arabs stayed because they supported IS, and so ten-
sions would occur. Therefore, these IDPs faced suspicion over their ideological status and sectarian
beliefs. For integrated emergency education to have provided a safe and stabilizing environment for
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all children in this context, the school and its teachers would have required speciﬁc training to deal
with such complex inter-ethnic dynamics.
Attempts at integrated education provision were not limited to Arbat. Across the region, scarcity
of school places led to calls for host communities to open schools to IDPs. In many locations, IDPs
have settled within ethnically afﬁliated areas, for example, Christians living in the predominantly
Christian area of Erbil named Ankawa, and schools have successfully accommodated some IDP
pupils. However, in other areas, this call fed directly into broader ethno-political conﬂict narratives.
For example, Ministry ofﬁcials shared that in Kirkuk, Kurdish schools were requested by the Min-
istry of Education to open their doors to Arab IDP children in their districts.2 Yet anecdotal reports
of some headmasters refusing IDP children entry to Kurdish schools were reported during data col-
lection in Kirkuk. This rejection was not framed in terms of lack of resources or fear of over-
stretching supplies. Instead, a more political motive was deemed to be behind the rejection.
Although under de facto Kurdish control since 2014, Kirkuk is a contested region and its resolu-
tion has been placed in the hands of Article 1403 of the Iraqi constitution, which calls for a census
and referendum. The ﬁght for Kirkuk is therefore a numbers game which demands representation
on the ground. A battle for demographic supremacy can be seen to be fought in order to demon-
strate this. As such, protecting ethnically deﬁned schools can be seen to be enforcing Kurdish
claims to administrative control and therefore safeguarding their security in the region (Shanks,
2016). In this way, calls for schools to accommodate displaced children can be seen to feed into
broader ethno-conﬂict narratives.
In many locations, such conﬂict-insensitive practices were avoided by the use of separate school
shifts for each displaced language community: Arabic and Kurdish. However, as the Arbat example
illustrates, in Iraq, linguistic indicators do not always denote a shared cultural, political or social
understanding. Education actors required a deeper understanding of the conﬂict and ethno-political
history in Iraq. Such examples illustrate the need for compulsory conﬂict or situational analysis to
underpin education interventions in fragile contexts.
School management and teacher recruitment
The INEE foundational standards for education in emergencies call for fair and equitable teacher
recruitment and selection that reﬂects the needs of the recipients. It also demands that education inter-
ventions examine the conditions for teachers and that support and supervision are given to schools
(INEE, 2010). The split in responsibility for IDP education in KRI based on language markers has
resulted in the two ministries both functioning within each camp and sometimes utilising the same
host school in shifts. Both ministries are dealing with different levels of need and managing different
budgets, with the KRI suffering economic crisis and civil servants going unpaid for extensive periods.
This has resulted in varied levels of education support and provision for each community.
The split in education management between two separate entities has resulted in communities
being able to view their own education access in comparison to that of their linguistically different
IDP neighbours. Relative deprivation theory, which posits that the perception that one group has
received less than they are due can lead to social conﬂict, suggests that such comparisons can serve
to deepen already fractured interethnic relations. This can cause resentment and tensions concerning
the level, or lack, of access being provided. The research was provided with the following manifes-
tations of this dilemma within emergency education provision in the KRI.
Teacher salaries
The economic crisis within the KRG limited the payment of all civil servant salaries, including
teachers, whereas, in contrast, the civil servants paid by Baghdad continued to receive their salaries
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even while displaced. This inequality was made apparent when schools administered by the differ-
ent authorities were working in shifts within one building, causing tension and resentment towards
Baghdad from the host community education ofﬁcials. This can feed into the wider political con-
ﬂict between the two regional seats of authority and also foster resentment of the Arab teachers
and IDPs. Such resentment was illustrated by one interviewee, who commented “Baghdad with-
holds our budget and we go without, we welcome the Arabs and help them, but they still have their
salaries, it is us (Kurds) who are suffering”. Furthermore, interventions by international organiza-
tions that pay volunteer teachers within IDP schools an incentive each month can also generate this
dynamic and cause tensions between qualiﬁed contracted teachers and untrained volunteer teachers
within schools.
Resource competition
The apparent difference in available resources between schools under each ministry has led to con-
ﬂict between school directors. Interviewees reported examples of conﬂicts between the head teach-
ers of Arabic and Kurdish schools in IDP camps over access to supplies. In one instance, reported
to the Education Cluster, the allocation of resources for a Kurdish language school from the KRG
was far superior to the support received by the Arabic language school from Baghdad. The Kurdish
school received desks and chairs while the Arabic school was left without. Despite sharing a school
building the headmaster of the Kurdish school actively prevented the Arabic school from using the
furniture, even when not in use by the Kurdish school – locking all resources away. Such protec-
tion over scarce resources during times of crisis is not uncommon. However, this conﬂict has the
potential to deepen divides between communities. The apparent inequality in resource provision
between the two groups can feed into perceptions of neglect and hamper government legitimacy in
the eyes of the Arabic-speaking community. Furthermore, resentment between communities over
the deliberate attempts to obstruct the Arabic schools’ access to resources can advance perceptions
of Kurdish hostility to non-Kurdish IDPs.
The research was presented with further evidence of inequality factors within the Arabic speaking
IDP education provision. The suggestion that the government-salaried Arab IDPs living within the
host community in Erbil had better access to education and greater support and focus from the
MoD Baghdad than the Arabic speaking minority communities living in the camps was prevalent
during focus groups. As would be expected, the economic status of government ofﬁcials affords
them greater access to all resources required and does not necessarily reﬂect a resource bias. How-
ever, the perception of increased support can lead to grievances between communities and
decreased government legitimacy.
Ensuring education provision is equitable is at the heart of conﬂict sensitivity. The complex
system of divided responsibility based, not on place of origin, but on linguistic afﬁliation, risks
hampering this aim.
Content and learning
Schools can have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on children through curriculum content, providing the
opportunity to reproduce dominant language and culture and ensuring their transmission to future
generations. A curriculum can teach history, religion and even geographical interpretations of
homelands through the channels of history and geography. As such, the curriculum and content are
often used to deny shared history and oppress minority language rights (Skutnabb-Kangas, 2002).
Therefore, to assess whether the content of education for IDPs in the KRI interacts with conﬂict
requires an analysis of the political control and administration of education. In terms of an emer-
gency situation, this issue may not take precedence as efforts are placed on providing basic
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protection. However, the extent to which the education system supports fundamental freedoms
through the representation of all groups should be examined.
In this respect, the provision of education for the linguistically divided Yezidi community was a
recurrent issue presented in focus groups. Yezidi IDPs have been displaced from areas that are
highly contested between Baghdad and Erbil. The population is split between Kurdish and Arabic
speakers, and also between those who identify as ethnically Kurdish those who reject this identity
in favour of a Yezidi ethno-religious identity. Therefore, IDP education provision for this group
technically continues to be split between both Baghdad and KRG. However, some IDP respondents
questioned the freedom to access Arabic language education and express non-Kurdish Yezidi iden-
tity within the education system.
A survey conducted by REACH in 2014 noted that 24 per cent of IDP children in Duhok gover-
norate who previously studied in Arabic were now enrolled in KRG Kurdish language schools.
Education literature demonstrates that children are more able to secure literacy in their ﬁrst lan-
guage and then to transfer those skills to the second language of instruction (August and Hakuta,
1998; Brock-Utne and Holmarsdottir, 2004; Rolstad et al., 2005; Abadzi, 2006). Therefore, the
change in language potentially placed this 24 per cent at an educational disadvantage. Yet, when
faced with the alternative of no access to education, delivery in a second language may have been
deemed the best solution. The overburdened IDP education system in Iraq has numerous obstacles
to overcome, and this change may well have reﬂected the dichotomy in funding between Arabic
and Kurdish schools at the time of the survey.
During consultations, however, the origins of this shift in medium of instruction were often pre-
sented in terms of the wider political and social divisions in the region. Some sections of the
Yezidi community perceived the shift to be a result of Kurdish authorities failing to respect Yezidi
communities who do not identity as Kurdish. Interviewees evidenced this accusation by highlight-
ing: the repeated reference to the “Kurdish Yezidi population” by the local media; a report of a
camp manager prohibiting Arabic music in a child-friendly space in a Yezidi majority camp;4 and
Kurdish language teachers being quick to negate the need for Arabic instruction for Yezidi pupils.5
Such events appeared to fuel fears that displaced Yezidi who did not identify as Kurdish risked
having their right to representation and mother tongue instruction in Arabic denied.
To understand this fear, we must further unpack the broader ethno-political environment. The
historical homeland of the Yezidi community in Ninewa was unofﬁcially claimed by the KRG after
the fall of the Ba’ath party in 2003, with an ofﬁcial narrative of ethnically Kurdish Yezidi villages
falling under their protection. While there is substantial evidence to support Kurdish claims to Sin-
jar, accusations have been heard of a process of ‘Kurdiﬁcation’ in a region that did not self-identify
as Kurdish (Natali, 2015; Smith and Shadarevian, 2017). Yezidi populations have registered threats
to their identity from Kurdish assimilation attempts since 2003, especially communities that cham-
pion administration of disputed territories by the central government and chose to use Baghdad
administered services (Barber, 2017). Calls from within the Yezidi community for greater recogni-
tion of the group as ethnically Yezidi have become even more vocal during displacement and in
the aftermath of Peshmerga’s withdrawal from Yezidi villages in June 2014.6 Despite the territorial
claim to Sinjar, Kurdish Peshmerga withdrew from the region immediately before the IS attack in
2014, that the United Nations says could amount to genocide. Consequently, many Yezidis have
also blamed the Kurdish Peshmerga for the IS atrocities, stating that they abandoned the residents
of the region (Barber, 2017).
If we take a constructivist stance on ethnicity formation we understand that social, political and
historical forces construct identity and that individual identities change over time as social contexts
change. Furthermore, people exhibit different identities in different contexts (Gee, 2000) and identi-
ties disappear and return, sometimes re-invented. From this perspective, we can see that the posi-
tion of education in most societies allows it to take on an essential role in the socialization of
ethnic identity. The content of education curricula can shape how children see themselves; it can
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inﬂuence their understanding of the conﬂict and their perceptions of the future. By encouraging the
use of the Kurdish curriculum in schools while in displacement, the Kurdish authorities are viewed
by some Yezidi as attempting to strengthen the claim to govern the disputed areas through strength-
ening the perception of the Yezidi community as ethnically Kurdish. Youth focus groups in IDP
camps in Duhok deﬁantly stated that they were not Kurdish and spoke of their rejection of what
they regarded as an “imposed” Kurdish identity. Social media sites also reﬂect this stance and
increasingly provocative anti-Kurd Facebook pages have expanded under Yezidi headings.
The choice of an education provider is therefore inherently political and is often contentious. Lan-
guage and curriculum choices can be perceived to beneﬁt some while marginalizing others. Dryden-
Peterson (2011: 70) notes that “Language decisions highlight for refugee children the power dynamics
of their situation”. In this case, some Yezidi perceive Kurdish administered schooling as a symbol of
assimilation, which translates to feelings of marginalization and disempowerment in relation to the
wider conﬂict and territorial dispute. Yet it is important to note that this reﬂects a split in the commu-
nity and a section of the Yezidi group self-represent as indeed ethnically ‘Kurdish’ and welcome the
provision of Kurdish language education while in displacement. This counter-narrative is equally
vocal in their position. The complex social-political alignment of Iraqi ethnic groups once more
demonstrating the need for heightened contextual awareness for humanitarian actors.
In order to ensure that education is conﬂict sensitive in such a complex ethnopolitical and social
context, extensive community consultation is required. Understanding that in Iraq ethnic groups do
not represent a homogenous political or social stance is vital when negotiating neutral and construc-
tive education access.
CONCLUSION
Education in conﬂict-affected areas has been examined in terms of its negative impact on the wider
conﬂict by a broad array of commentators. Yet, in terms of international practitioners and educa-
tionalists working in such environments, the same practical indicators and assessment tools are still
prevalent: enrolment ﬁgures, school buildings and textbook supply are often prioritized over evalua-
tions of education’s interaction with conﬂict. Contextualization of education policy remains an
often-neglected process in conﬂict-affected countries.
Therefore, this article strove to shift the emphasis from a standard evaluation of education ser-
vices for displaced populations to one that examines education’s wider role and political impact. In
order to address the adverse interactions of education with conﬂict, we must ﬁrst have a clear
understanding of their origins. A conﬂict-sensitive analysis of education is being championed by
organizations like the Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) and UNICEF’s
Peace-building Education and Advocacy programme (PBEA), but their efforts have yet to be main-
streamed into standard practice and remain unfocused and broad in their application, failing to
inﬂuence everyday education assessment and planning methodology.
The article has demonstrated the complexity of IDP education delivery in the KRI, providing
examples of how the current conﬂict, ethno-political background and education can interact. Ethnic
diversity, historical and territorial disputes and current sectarian-driven agendas each overlap to
ensure that education delivery for displaced populations is inherently political. IDP education provi-
sion in the KRI fails to be conﬂict sensitive and currently intersects with debates over territorial
control and return, identity-driven security and issues of equality.
This is due to a lack of contextual understanding in terms of both the operating environment and
education’s potential inﬂuence. The provision of schooling for displaced populations has therefore
fed directly into conﬂict narratives on a number of occasions. Ensuring conﬂict sensitivity within
emergency education provision is no doubt an arduous task and Iraq represents one of the most
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complex operating environments for humanitarian actors, yet there two critical aims that can be fur-
ther developed to support this objective.
Firstly, the systematic generation and use of evidence and knowledge related to education, con-
ﬂict and the socio-political environment is required. This would aim to ensure that activities are
evidence-based and sensitive to ongoing ﬂuctuations in stability. The use of community conﬂict-
monitoring systems and organizational conﬂict analysis tools should be routine in education inter-
ventions to monitor levels of tensions and provide contextual understanding.
Secondly, there is a need to clarify administrative responsibility. Currently, there is no one single
institution or body in charge of IDP education delivery and overlapping jurisdictions have con-
tributed towards the problems documented. However, this requires political will and economic com-
mitments. Hence, while the article can recommend a number of technical and policy suggestions
on how to tackle the delivery of education for displaced communities in the KRI, their implementa-
tion will ultimately depend on the sustained political will to resolve the different issues in a fair,
transparent and non-discriminatory fashion. Therefore, ﬁrst and foremost, the political commitment
to provide equality of education is required.
NOTES
1. For Focus Group Discussions (FGD), IDP and refugees between the ages of 16–21 were invited to take part.
Ethical considerations with regard to conducting FGDs with youth were reﬂected upon carefully in consulta-
tion with local groups working on protection. In response to this, the researcher provided a clear explanation of
the project and sought participant (if under 18, caregiver’s – only two participants in total) oral consent in
advance of the group. The introduction to the FGD was speciﬁc in making clear that the research was only a
reporting mechanism that could not guarantee any form of deliverable or change in camp policy. Before con-
sent was obtained it was explained that participation was entirely voluntary and that non-participation (or with-
drawal after starting) would have no adverse practical consequences for the participants.
2. Article 140 of the new Iraqi constitution necessitates a three-stage process: normalisation, census and refer-
endum. Normalisation would be achieved by the assisted return of internally displaced people and the
recovery of their property
3. References to the Yezidi population in Kurdish media systematically refer to them as Kurdish Yezidi,
despite rejections of this by many in the community
4. This accusation was triangulated with education cluster meeting minutes and found to have been docu-
mented once
5. Kurdish language teachers in three Duhok camps denied that any Yezdi IDPs need Arabic instruction, stat-
ing that ‘all Yezidi speak Kurdish’
6. The escape of many Yezidi IDPs to Syria and Duhok has instead been accredited to the actions of neigh-
bouring Kurdish groups the PKK and the People’s Protection Units (YPG). Sinjar was eventually liberated
through a joint assault by the local Yezidi forces, the PKK and KDP Peshmerga in 2015, but it remains lar-
gely unpopulated. The liberating forces each rushed to raise their partisan ﬂags over signiﬁcant government
buildings and claim the victory; demonstrating the competing interests and agendas of actors in the city.
This prompted Barazani to declare that only the Kurdistan ﬂag could be raised as the victory was deemed a
Peshmerga one, dismissing the role of Yezidi militias and PKK ﬁghters and causing further tensions.
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